

“Environmentalism without social struggle is just gardening”: the Ricardian dynamics of the metabolic rift

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Abstract

This paper puts forward an ecological interpretation of the earliest model of economic growth in the history of economic thought. Developed by David Ricardo two hundred years ago, it shows how, in a world of limited natural resources, the economy will inevitably evolve towards a steady state of no growth. This paper follows this model to argue that the fundamental problem of anthropogenic climate change is not economic growth per se, as de-growth will occur no matter what, but the distribution of income among workers, capitalists, and landlords. The latter, landlords, are the private owners of the limited natural resources, an often neglected income class in macroeconomic models that in Ricardo's model eventually seize all the economic surplus. Under the simple assumption of a linear decrease in the productivity of labor (i.e. decreasing returns to scale), the dynamic model of economic growth becomes logistic, driven by a single parameter that is shown to be the rate of economic surplus or exploitation. In this sense, the Ricardian model illustrates the critical relevance of class conflict in determining different scenarios of economic decline, either in the form of a smooth convergence towards ecological equilibrium for low values of the rate of surplus or wildly chaotic, ungovernable oscillations in population and economic output for high values of the same parameter. Finally, the model is empirically calibrated with actual values of the rate of surplus computed for many different countries, which anticipates that the decline of the economic system may turn very unstable for most countries if the exploitation of workers remains at such high level.

Keywords: degrowth, dynamical model, class conflict, chaos, ecological political economy, David Ricardo

1. Introduction

“Environmentalism without social struggle is just gardening” is a popular saying coined by Chico Mendes, internationally renowned environmental activist and leader of the Xapuri Rural Worker’s Union, a trade union of rubber tappers in the Brazilian state of Acre in the western Amazon (Mendes & Gross, 1989). Born into poverty, Mendes started working at age 9 in debt peonage, learned to read and write by himself at age 20, and was murdered at age 44 by landlords due to his standoffs, or *empates*, with beef-exporting ranchers to prevent the deforestation of the Amazon, the source of the rubber tappers’ livelihood. His assassination was the 90th murder of an environmentalist activist in Brazil in 1988.

Mendes’ saying and life, among many others fighting for their lands, encapsulates well the conundrum currently faced by the whole of humanity regarding the climate crisis. While “climate change is a global emergency” for nearly two-thirds (64%) of the 1.2 million respondents to the largest public opinion survey on climate change ever conducted [UNDP 2021], the current trajectory of carbon emissions still sets the course for an increase of 3.2C of global warming, in which ecological and economic catastrophe may almost certainly ensue, well beyond the looming tipping points of 1.5C and 2C. Despite UN IPCC warnings that ambitious large-scale structural change of our economies is urgently required in the coming years, carbon-intensive economic activities maintain business as usual and the effectiveness of climate policies such as carbon pricing is actually very limited, leading to pervasive ‘climate anxiety’ among the population, political advocacy and protests to the extent that some wonder whether civil disobedience is justified (Capstick et al., 2022).

Why is so little done regarding the climate crisis, considering its extreme severity, acknowledged by a majority of humanity as it calls for widespread climate action? Exploring diverse climate-related issues in governance and modeling, the fossil fuel industry and energy systems, international political economy, militarism, financialization, and inequality, a comprehensive critical review emphasized the cross-cutting, central role of power in impeding determinate climate action (Stoddard et al., 2021) [Supran and Oreskes 2021, Frasca]: climate policy is a socially contested process that collectively arises from power struggles among many interest groups with different, often conflicting, material motivations. Climate policies may ideally be very effective on paper when theoretically proposed, but watered down or even straight rejected, when materially implemented in practice, by an unequal balance of political power tilted towards powerful adverse interest groups. Inequality matters in shaping climate policy: discussing how the struggles of the poor are also ecological struggles for basic needs such as energy, food, and water, Martínez-Alier already highlighted three decades ago the centrality of social movements for environmental justice, inequality, and class conflict in shaping climate politics (Martinez-Alier, 1991, 2003). Conversely, an increase in top income inequality is positively associated with CO_2 emissions (Hailemariam et al., 2020); the top 10% of world income emits 50% of the carbon emissions, which the UN Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change

35 argues would suffice to curb global warming within sustainable limits (Kartha et al., 2020).

36 In other words, how do the environmental limits to economic growth at the center of ecological eco-
37 nomics, that is, the ‘planetary boundaries’, actually assert themselves upon society? Not by thermodynam-
38 ics [Georgescu-Roegen], knowledge dissemination, hard biophysical limits, demographics [Daly, Malthus], or
39 natural resource depletion in itself [Meadows], but they are rather mediated by material, societal, conflict-
40 ing struggles for income: this paper argues so by presenting a stylized, formal model of economic growth
41 under limited natural resources that follows an ecological interpretation of the earliest growth model known
42 in political economy, developed by Ricardo two-hundred years ago in 1824 to highlight the critical, com-
43 plex interaction between growth and income distribution – the “principal problem in political economy”
44 according to Ricardo (Ricardo, 1971; Kaldor, 1955; Pasinetti, 1977; Bhaduri & Harris, 1987). Under the
45 classical-ecological view, while economic growth is, of course, the main driver of human-made climate change,
46 whether and how the economy reaches or not a steady state of balance or equilibrium with the environment
47 –how the natural limits to growth eventually assert themselves upon an exponentially-growing economy,
48 that is, the shape of the dynamical trajectory converging towards or gravitating around the steady state–
49 critically depend on the property relations underpinning socio-economic inequality, understood as the social
50 distribution of economic output and thus functional class income in the form of wages, profits, and rent,
51 respectively among workers, capitalists, and landlords, the latter being the private owners of the limited
52 natural resources available: land, but also water, oil, energy, or critical minerals.

53 In line with what authors in the political-ecology tradition such as Bellamy Foster (2000), Moore (2015),
54 Malm (2016), or Huber (Huber, 2022), this paper argues that a material analysis of economic power that
55 emphasizes the relevance of social class, property relations, and socio-economic inequality is fundamental
56 for ecological economics to properly understand the societal dynamics of the climate crisis and the political
57 economy of climate action and inaction that underpins it – in other words, how the ‘metabolic rift’ unfolds
58 between the economy and the environment (Foster, 2000).

59 Overpopulation

60 The problem of distribution is not new at all to ecological economics, ecological macroeconomics, and eco-
61 logical growth theory in particular (Rezai & Stagl, 2016; Taylor et al., 2016; Hardt & O’Neill, 2017). However,
62 these have generally been neglected fields of study, as ecological economics rarely addressed the macroeco-
63 nomic dimension in terms of theory and modeling in its analysis until recently (Spash and Schadl, 2009).
64 While many recent post-growth and ecological macroeconomic models now incorporate income distribution,
65 the social classes explicitly featured are only workers and capitalists as in conventional post-Keynesian mod-
66 eling. Hence, none explicitly addresses the rentier class based on the private ownership of natural resources
67 as the actual limiting factor of economic growth, underlying Ricardo’s original explanation for the tendency
68 of the profit rate to fall. Daly already recognized Ricardo’s stylized model as envisioning a growing economy

69 under limited natural resources to eventually reach a steady state of secular stagnation following a ‘profit
70 squeeze’ due to an increasing rentier income share: economic growth, driven by profit-driven investment by
71 capitalists, gradually dwindles over time as more and more output goes, instead of profit, as rent to the
72 private owners of natural resources. In other words, for Ricardo, de-growth was already the inexorable end
73 state of the economic system when limited natural resources are available; Ricardian analysis thus offers an
74 interesting formalization of the concept of an environmental ‘carrying capacity’ or ‘planetary boundaries’ in
75 ecological economics.

76 Most importantly, a contribution of this paper is to show that the dynamic pathways of convergence
77 towards equilibrium critically depend, in Bhaduri and Harris’ interpretation of the Ricardian growth model
78 (1987), on the functional distribution of income, yielding a more desirable ‘smooth landing’ or a ‘Mad Max’
79 dystopian scenario of wildly chaotic, ungovernable fluctuations. As they show, a linearly decreasing marginal
80 productivity of natural resources (the most general assumption of decreasing returns to scale), yields the so-
81 called logistic equation, of widespread use in population ecology. The logistic equation shows very different
82 transitory dynamics depending on its single driving parameter, which is the rate of ecological-economic
83 surplus or, in classical terms, the rate of exploitation. Hence, rather than being utopian as Daly claimed, the
84 issue then is not de-growth, as it will inexorably arrive, but *how we reach it*. Following empirical evidence
85 at hand (Rotta & Kumar, 2024), I describe the starkly uneven paths of ecological-economic decline available
86 for different countries.

87 The paper is organized as follows. It first reviews the issue of de-growth (Georgescu-Roegen). Then it
88 describes the Ricardian growth model.

89 **2. The political-economic nature of the limits to growth**

90 A most fundamental insight put forward by ecological economics is that an economy cannot expand
91 indefinitely in a world of limited natural resources. However, the actual mechanism by which such limits to
92 growth occur is less clear: we know that the steady state of the economic system is desirable, but we do not
93 know how it is reached.

94 In his seminal *magnum opus* “The Entropy Law and the Economic Process” (1971), Georgescu-Roegen
95 persuasively challenged the possibility of perpetual economic growth by arguing that economic processes are
96 also physical in nature, so that economic analysis needs to account for the principles of thermodynamics,
97 most importantly the fundamental second law of entropy, which casts a specific direction upon the ‘arrow
98 of time’, determining the fundamental irreversibility of all thermodynamic processes leading to the inex-
99 orable degradation of matter and energy and even a hypothetical heat death of the universe. However, while
100 Georgescu-Roegen’s thermodynamic theorization offers a compelling research programme that is founda-
101 tional in ecological economics, the law of entropy may fall short as a convincing mechanism to explain the

102 impossibility of perpetual growth (Schwartzman, 2008).

103 Using the thermodynamic concept of entropy, Kåberger and Månsson (2001) show that, even in the long
104 run, entropy production associated with material dissipation need not be a limiting factor for economic
105 development: a simple, quantitative analysis shows that the rate of entropy production caused by human
106 economic activities is practically negligible compared to the continuous natural entropy production in the
107 atmosphere and on the Earth's surface; hence, societal entropy production is well within the range of natural
108 variation. The biophysical world that contains the economic subsystem is not isolated but closed, as it
109 constantly exchanges solar energy with its surroundings (Schwartzman, 2008). Hence, by converting low-
110 entropy, high-temperature energy in the form of solar radiation to high entropy, low temperature heat, work
111 can be produced to recycle *de facto* indefinitely within a human timescale (Ayres, 1998; Kåberger & Månsson,
112 2001; Schwartzman, 2008).

113 In terms of growth theory, ecological economists have long argued that economic growth can only be
114 understood in terms of material throughput and, in particular energy or, in Ayres' reformulation, 'exergy',
115 i.e. the maximum amount of useful work that can be extracted from a system or energy source (Rezai &
116 Stagl, 2016). In two important articles at the beginning of the 1990s, Herman Daly contended that scale,
117 rather than allocation or distribution, must be the main focus of environmental macroeconomics, where scale
118 refers to the rate of physical exchanges or throughput, measured by population times per capita resource use,
119 between the world and its economic subsystem (Daly, 1991, 1992). Under this view, 'optimal scale' should be
120 another macroeconomic policy goal like full employment and price stability, although optimal is ambiguous
121 as it can be defined from a narrow utilitarian, extractive, anthropo-centric perspective or from the broader
122 perspective of the sustainability for the biosphere (Daly, 1991). Importantly, Daly's argument that these
123 goals are fundamentally independent was critically received, noting that scale has both sustainability and
124 equity implications, especially from a Global South perspective (Prakash & Gupta, 1994; Malghan, 2010).
125 In the seminal 'The Economics of the Steady State', Daly (?) discusses the urgent desirability of the steady
126 state in the sense of a much-needed balanced relationship between the economy and the environment and
127 speculates with the kind of institutions that may support it, namely population control through marketable
128 birth quotas and resource control through state-determined depletion quotas.

129 Taking on Daly's call to advance the field of ecological macroeconomics, Heyes (2000) interestingly
130 suggested a formalization of his notion of an environmental carry capacity supporting the optimal sustainable
131 scale incorporating an 'ecological equilibrium' curve, defined by a constant physical stock of natural capital
132 (Costanza & Daly, 1992), to the conventional textbook IS-LM model. However, the main insight of the
133 model limits itself to the simple fact that higher levels of output have to be accompanied by higher levels
134 of resource productivity and lower levels of waste in order to keep throughput constant (Rezai & Stagl,
135 2016). Moreover, the IS-LM framework bears important critics (Romer, 2000), starting by its own creator,

136 John Hicks himself, and many also in the post-Keynesian tradition (Ferri & Minsky, 1989; Setterfield, 2009),
137 which most notably highlight the incapacity of the framework to incorporate dynamics (Davidson, 1980): in
138 this sense, the environmental macroeconomic equilibrium of the EE-IS-LM model is, in fact, not a naturally-
139 occurring outcome: no natural forces ensure the automatic adjustment to the EE curve (Lawn, 2003).

140 While dynamics are treated explicitly by conventional models on the traditional macroeconomics of cli-
141 mate change, such as the canonical DICE model (Nordhaus, 1993, 2018), those are subject to the optimal
142 control of welfare maximization, thus informing an anthropo-centric ‘optimal scale’ following the utilitarian
143 trade-off between the costs of climate change and of its mitigation. A biospheric notion of optimal scale could
144 be inferred if emissions could be considered a stylized measure of throughput, which may be overtly reduc-
145 tionistic within the scope of ecological economics. The nature of transitional dynamics between equilibria
146 are generally not investigated explicitly in such models, which lack dynamical realism (Grubb et al., 2021).
147 Their dynamical trajectories do not fundamentally differ much due to a general low parameter sensitivity,
148 are generally monotonic, showing a maximum number of one optima, and do not necessarily reach the steady
149 state when variables reach stationarity. Hackett and Moxnes extend the DICE model by including a definition
150 of natural capital (Hackett & Moxnes, 2015). Computational general equilibrium models on climate change
151 mitigation are generally static, not dynamic (?).

152 In Rosser (2001), various complex dynamics in ecologic–economic systems are presented with an emphasis
153 upon models of global warming dynamics and fishery dynamics. Chaotic and catastrophic dynamic patterns
154 are shown to be possible, along with other complex dynamics arising from non-linearities in such combined
155 systems.

156 In contrast to the neoclassical stylization of the individual as fundamentally utility-maximizing, classical
157 political economy views each social class as following, overall, starkly different behavioral principles: workers’
158 goal is not maximizing utility but securing basic survival, which they obtain exchanging their labor for a
159 living wage. Instead, it is competitive profit-seeking capitalists that drive overall growth as they re-invest
160 their profits, while rentiers are an unproductive, leisure class that exclusively lives straight off the surpluses
161 generated. MALTHUS. REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS - ECO-FEMINIST CRITIQUE

162 **3. The Ricardian Model of Economic Growth under Limited Natural Resources**

163 Ricardo, one of the wealthiest economists in history and one of the seminal authors in the tradition of
164 classical political economy, developed his seminal ‘corn model’ as a political argument in the context of the
165 heated debate taking place in Great Britain regarding the Corn Laws, tariffs on imported food and corn
166 enforced between 1815 and 1846 that symbolized the mercantilist trade policy of the time. In a defense of
167 free trade, Ricardo justified repealing such tariffs by explaining the secular decline in profitability, and thus
168 economic growth, as a ‘profit squeeze’ due to increasing rent pressures, as an ever-increasing share of output




Figure 1: Visualization of the Ricardian growth model

169 devoted to the landlords in the form of economic rents as less and less fertile land is cultivated over time. In
 170 classical and neoclassical economics, economic growth is supply-led, driven by the profit-seeking investment
 171 by the owners of capital. In Ricardo’s model, growth gradually dwindles over time as more and more output
 172 goes, instead of profit, as rent to the private owners of natural resources.

173 In this context, the interaction between economic growth and the distribution of income in wages, profits,
 174 and rent among workers, capitalists, and landlords was the “principal problem in political economy” (Ricardo,
 175 1971). The underlying assumption of decreasing returns to scale due to declining fertility of land is critical
 176 in Ricardo’s argument. For Kaldor (1955), Ricardian theory was based on two separate principles under the
 177 crucial assumption of diminishing returns: the “marginal principle”, which applies to the productivity of
 178 natural resources and thus the rentier share of economic output, and the “surplus principle” that divides the
 179 residue between wages and profits. In this stylized context, land can be interpreted in a general, abstract
 180 way, that is, as ‘natural resources’ that are privately owned, limited, and exhaustible (Pearce & Turner,
 181 1989): this can be oil, gas, or critical mineral resources such as lithium or magnesium, as well as water and,

182 of course, land itself. Decreasing returns to scale is a general property of such limited natural resources: for
 183 instance, South African gold mining, leading the world after China surpassed it in 2009, has steadily seen
 184 its production costs rise in the last decades (?). In particular, diminishing returns apply to carbon-based
 185 energy sources such as oil, gas, and coal (as well as nuclear energy) as their useful energy inflation-adjusted
 186 costs have only increased since the 1960s, in stark contrast to the plummeting costs of renewable sources
 187 (Way et al., 2022). Some authors have suggested that the whole US economy had slightly decreasing returns
 188 to scale (Basu & Fernald, 1997).

189 Following the work of Kaldor (Kaldor, 1955), Pasinetti presents the highly simplified economic system
 190 that Ricardo discusses in the *Principles of Political Economy* (1971) in which only one commodity, corn, is
 191 produced, e.g. an aggregate, one-sector model. This paper follows the formulation of Bhaduri and Harris
 192 (1987).

193 Consider an economy where labor N is applied in fixed proportion to less and less fertile land as the
 194 margin of cultivation is extended in the process of capital accumulation. Accordingly, there exists a falling
 195 marginal product curve for labor with fixed “doses” of land, which decreases linearly. The linear decrease in
 196 marginal productivity is the most stylized simplification of the existence of hard limits of natural resources,
 197 subject to decreasing returns to scale.

198 In such a stylized theory, (corn) output Y is produced by labor N , working in fixed proportion on less
 199 and less productive land along the process of capital accumulation, which raises labor N and thus output Y
 200 over time:

$$201 \qquad Y = f(N) \qquad (1)$$

202 with properties $f(0) \geq 0$, $f'(1) > w$, and $f''(N) < 0$. Following the marginal principle, (differential) rent R
 203 is the difference between average $AP = Y/N$ and the marginal product $MP = Y'$ of land,

$$204 \qquad R = N(AP - MP) = f(N) - Nf'(N) \qquad (2)$$

205 Following the surplus principle, profits are the remainder of the output after subtracting differential rent
 206 and wages:

$$207 \qquad P = Y - R - W \qquad (3)$$

208 where the wage bill W is

$$209 \qquad W = wN \qquad (4)$$

210 at a constant wage rate w .

211 Bhaduri and Harris (1987) suggest the simplest functional form for the function f , which arises from

Class	Income	Share
Output	$Y = aN - 0.5bN^2$	$\iota = 1$
Rents	$R = 0.5bN^2$	$\rho = \frac{bN}{2a-bN}$
Wages	$W = wN$	$\omega = \frac{2w}{2a-bN}$
Profits	$P = (a-w)N - bN^2$	$\pi = \frac{2a-2w-2bN}{2a-bN}$

Table 1: **Functional Classes of Income and their Shares of Output**

212 considering a linear decrease for the marginal productivity of labor, with parameters a and b :

$$213 \quad MP = f'(N) = a - bN \quad a > 0, \quad b > 0 \quad (5)$$

214 so that rent is

$$215 \quad R = \frac{bN^2}{2} \quad (6)$$

216 and output follows a quadratic form:

$$217 \quad Y = f(N) = aN - bN^2/2 \quad (7)$$

218 In the Ricardian model, economic growth is driven by profits. The dynamics of the wage bill capture
219 the whole process of accumulation in this simple economy. Following classical principles, its time difference
220 entirely comes from reinvestment of capitalist profits:

$$221 \quad W_{t+1} - W_t = P_t \quad (8)$$

222 Using both marginal (2) and surplus principles (3) in addition to the assumption of a linear decrease in the
223 productivity of labor (5),

$$224 \quad W_{t+1} = P_t + W_t = Y_t - R_t = Y_t - Y_t + N \frac{dY}{N} = N \frac{dY}{N} = aN - bN^2 \quad (9)$$

225 yielding, after substituting the wage bill by employment times the wage rate, the discrete dynamic equation
226 of motion:

$$227 \quad N_{t+1} = \frac{a}{w}N_t - \frac{b}{w}N_t^2 = \frac{a}{w}N_t \left(1 - \frac{b}{a}N_t\right) \quad (10)$$

228 4. An Ecological Interpretation

229 Most significantly, equation (10) is the two-parameter version of the logistic growth equation that is much
230 well-known in population ecology, but less discussed in economics until very recently (Galanis et al., 2024).

231 In the Ricardian growth model, the logistic equation models the growth of an economy N in an environment
 232 under limited natural resources, where the ratio between the technical parameter a over the social wage w

$$233 \quad r = \frac{a}{w} \quad (11)$$

234 corresponds to the reproduction rate r of the economy and the ratio of technical parameters a and b ,
 235 describing the decreasing linear slope of the marginal productivity curve (5),

$$236 \quad K = \frac{a}{b} \quad (12)$$

237 corresponds to the *carrying capacity of the natural environment*, usually denoted by K (Chapman & Byron,
 238 2018):

$$239 \quad X_{t+1} = \underbrace{rX_t}_{\text{exponential term}} \underbrace{\left(1 - \frac{X_t}{K}\right)}_{\text{starvation term}} \quad (13)$$

240 Carrying capacity K implies a notion of hard natural bounds or biophysical limits to population growth
 241 imposed by the environment, for instance in the form of available food in population ecology or land in
 242 the Ricardian model. For this reason, the notion of environmental carrying capacity for human society is
 243 also widely discussed in ecological economics, for instance in the writings of Herman Daly (Daly, 1990a,b).
 244 When the population size is small relative to the carrying capacity, the population will increase exponentially
 245 without bounds, at a reproduction rate proportional to its own size, i.e. rX_t . However, when the population
 246 reaches the vicinity of the carrying capacity $X_t \sim K$, the starvation effect of the second term prevails, so
 247 that the growth rate decreases at a rate that depends on the carrying capacity and the economy stabilizes
 248 within the natural limits; growth becomes negative and the population contracts if $X_t > K$.

249 4.1. Ecological-Economic Equilibrium

250 Such biophysical limits of the environment impose a specific ecological scale K within which an economy
 251 can grow, which in the Ricardian model is determined by the technical parameters a and b (the intercept
 252 and slope of the linearly decreasing returns to scale) in critical interaction with the social wage w . In this
 253 simple dynamical discrete-time system, two fixed points (i.e. where no growth occurs) exist, a trivial one at
 254 $N^* = 0$ and another one at

$$255 \quad N^* = \frac{a - w}{b} \quad (14)$$

256 OR

$$257 \quad X^* = K \left(1 - \frac{1}{r}\right) \quad (15)$$




Figure 2: **Scenarios of Single-Parameter Logistic Growth**

258 In such ecological-economic equilibrium, the marginal productivity of labor MP^* is equal to the given real
 259 wage rate w , so that all profit disappears $P^* = 0$ due to a profit squeeze driven by increasing rents, as
 260 the whole surplus over the wage bill accrues to the landlords as rent – the canonical *Ricardian stationary*
 261 *state* of no growth. Hence, in the Ricardian model of growth under limited natural resources, the economic
 262 system will actually never grow exponentially indefinitely, but rather inevitably evolve towards such the
 263 steady state of an ecological scale K determined by how much economic-ecological surplus can be extracted
 264 at the expense of the social wage w in a situation of ecological-economic balance.

265 The two-parameter version of logistic growth can be further simplified if population size X is normalized
 266 by the carrying capacity K , i.e. $x \equiv X/K$, yielding:

267
$$x_t = rx_t(1 - x_t) \tag{16}$$

268 Likewise, a new variable n_t can be defined in the Ricardian model by dividing N_t by the carrying capacity
 269 $K = a/b$,

270
$$n_t \equiv \frac{bN_t}{a} \tag{17}$$

271 which lies between 0 and 1 as a measure of density. This allows to re-write the Ricardian model in simplified
 272 form under a single driving parameter:

273
$$n_{t+1} = \frac{a}{w} n_t(1 - n_t) \tag{18}$$




Figure 3: **Scenarios of 2-Parameter Logistic Growth** Wage rate is set at $w = 10$, the reproduction rate is thus $a/w = 0.1w$, and the carrying capacity is a/b .

274 with two fixed points, $n^* = 0$ and

$$275 \quad n^* = 1 - \frac{w}{a} \quad (19)$$

276 OR

$$277 \quad x^* = 1 - \frac{1}{r} \quad (20)$$

278 4.2. Complex Dynamics

279 While the carrying capacity K determines the ecological scale imposed by limited natural resources, it is
 280 the reproduction rate r , which highlights the critical interaction between economic growth and distribution
 281 at the core of the Ricardian model, that determines how the economy dynamically converges to it, following
 282 very different transition regimes: starvation, sigmoidal growth, damped oscillations, steady oscillations, or
 283 even deterministic chaos. Bhaduri and Harris (1987) show that the single parameter $r \equiv \frac{a}{w}$ is associated to
 284 the maximum rate of exploitation of labor and nature (or ecological-economic surplus) at the initial state of

285 the system $t = 0$, i.e. ϵ_0 , something akin the classical notion of “primitive accumulation” in which common
 286 nature is initially privatized to set the course for capital accumulation (Robinson, 1969):

$$287 \quad r \equiv \frac{a}{w} = \frac{a - w + w}{w} = 1 + \frac{a - w}{w} = 1 + \epsilon_0 \quad (21)$$

288 denoting the original proportion of economic-ecological surplus $a - w$ over the social wage rate w at time 0,
 289 so that equilibrium values become

$$290 \quad n^* = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon_0} = \frac{\epsilon_0}{1 + \epsilon_0} \quad (22)$$

291 and

$$292 \quad N^* = \epsilon_0 \frac{w}{b} \quad (23)$$

293 As dynamical-systems theory shows, the ratio of ecological-economic surplus, $r = a/w = 1 + \epsilon_0$, critically
 294 regulates the dynamical behavior of logistic growth in a very well-known form in population ecology (see
 295 figures 2, 3). Despite its stylized simplicity, the logistic model is in fact able to yield very complex dynamics
 296 far beyond conventional sigmoidal growth depending on such critical parameter. While the economy evolves
 297 following a conventional logistic curve only for low values of the rate of economic surplus, logistic growth
 298 becomes oscillatory and eventually chaotic for high values of the rate of surplus (see figures 4, 5):

- 299 • *Starvation* With r between 0 and 1, the population will eventually die, independent of the initial
 300 population, as the economy is unable to generate a surplus over wages. The economy is not viable as
 301 the surplus rate is negative.
- 302 • *Sigmoidal Growth* With r between 1 and 2 (i.e. $0 < \epsilon_0 < 1$), the economy is viable and will quickly
 303 approach the steady state (22) or (23) in logistic fashion. The economy smoothly stabilizes to its
 304 steady state without much difficulty in harmony with the natural environment. At the steady state
 305 under a zero surplus rate, all output goes to wages; as the surplus rate increases, more output goes to
 306 rents at the steady state. Transitory nonzero profits quickly dwindle to zero due to the profit squeeze
 307 by rents.
- 308 • *Damped Oscillations* With r between 2 and 3 (i.e. $1 < \epsilon_0 < 2$), the economy will also eventually
 309 approach the same value $1 - \frac{1}{r}$, but first will fluctuate around that value for some time, as it initially
 310 overshoots and undershoots beyond the carrying capacity of the environment. In that transitory phase,
 311 declining profits oscillate around zero as they drive the growth of the system.
- 312 • *Steady Oscillations* With r between 3 and $1 + \sqrt{6} \sim 3.44949$, from almost all initial conditions the
 313 population will approach permanent oscillations between two values, which depend on r . The repro-
 314 duction rate is high enough so the economy constantly overshoots and undershoots beyond K , unable

315 to eventually stabilize with the environment, fraught by booms and busts driven by the steady oscilla-
316 tions in profits around zero. Until $r = 3$, the bifurcation graphs (4 and 5) show the steady state of the
317 system and its corresponding income shares. From then on, it shows the discrete states around which
318 the system oscillates.

- 319 • *Period-Doubling Cascade* With r between 3.44949 and 3.54409 (approximately), from almost all initial
320 conditions the population will approach permanent oscillations among four values. With r increasing
321 beyond 3.54409, from almost all initial conditions the population will approach oscillations among 8
322 values, then 16, 32, ...: this behavior is the most well-known example of a period-doubling cascade,
323 a very peculiar route to deterministic chaos (see the bifurcation graph 4, which features the period-
324 doubling cascade as a sequential branching process).
- 325 • *Onset of Deterministic Chaos* At $r \sim 3.56995$ is the onset of chaos, at the end of the period-doubling
326 cascade. From almost all initial conditions, we no longer see oscillations of finite period that is propor-
327 tional to 2. Although the dynamical behavior is still deterministic, it becomes, paradoxically, highly
328 unpredictable due to its high sensitivity to initial conditions: in the jargon of dynamical-systems the-
329 ory, chaos sets in (Strogatz, 2014). From an ecological-economic point of view, the rate of extraction is
330 so high that a proper balance is unfeasible: ecological collapse ensues quasi-periodically, unpredictably.
331 In the bifurcation graph 4, graphing all the states visited by the system after $t = 20$ shows a myriad
332 of points as no state visited by the system is exactly equal to any other. However, very specific islands
333 of stability occur, where the system oscillates between only three specific states over time.

334 Such complex behavior with respect to the rate of ecological-economic exploitation $r = a/w$ illustrates
335 the impact of the hard limits of the natural environment on economic growth, especially at high levels of
336 natural-resource extraction without consideration for ecological balance, disrupting the natural cycles of the
337 environment and degrading it in the process. Due to the oscillatory behavior beyond $r = 3$, there may be
338 episodes of actual growth within specific time windows, but on average growth will always be zero. The
339 higher the rate of ecological-economic surplus r , the more unstable the system is, and the more prone to
340 extreme oscillatory behavior. Hence, such logistic dynamics illustrate the classical notion of the “metabolic
341 rift” (Foster, 2000).

342 4.3. *Technical Change or Degrowth?*

343 Despite its simplicity, the ecological Ricardian growth model illustrates with clarity the potential impact
344 of technical change in addressing the climate crisis. In this pressing context, there is an intense debate about
345 whether there may exist a ‘technological fix’ as an alternative solution to climate change other than de-
346 growth, for instance in the form of beliefs in technical innovation able to decouple emissions from economic




Figure 4: **Bifurcation Graph** For $0 < r < 3$, the bifurcation graph shows the steady state of the system with respect to r . From then on, it shows the states between which the system oscillates following a period-doubling cascade. Chaos sets in at $r \sim 3.56995$.




Figure 5: **Bifurcation Graph with Income Shares** Steady states of the income shares depending on technical parameter a given $w = 10$.

347 activity, such as carbon capture technologies (Anderson & Bows, 2011). Empirical evidence shows that such
 348 decoupling is very unlikely, a critical argument in the de-growth literature (Parrique et al., 2019).

349 As seen in figure 3, although the technical parameter a is linearly present in both terms, the rate of
 350 ecological-economic exploitation a/w , which corresponds to the reproduction rate r in population ecology,
 351 is independent of the carrying capacity of the natural environment a/b , e.g. the population and economic
 352 output it can support. Through a decrease of the technical parameter b , technical innovation may be very




Figure 6: **Empirical Values of the Rate of Surplus Value** (Rotta & Kumar, 2024)

353 well able to increase the population and raise the living standards the environment and the economy can
 354 support, but this will have no impact on the actual dynamical behavior of the system, which critically
 355 depends on income distribution, in short, on how much both labor and nature are exploited: if the rate
 356 of ecological-economic surplus is high enough, it will always yield oscillations or chaos, irrespective of the
 357 carrying capacity. The only effect of technical change is to let the economy grow, on average, at the same
 358 pace the carrying capacity grows; if existing, oscillations will persist – it consists, in figure 3, of moving up
 359 vertically in the same column, decreasing the slope of the marginal productivity curve a/b (e.g. the carrying
 360 capacity) by reducing b but keeping the a coefficient constant. Malthusian accounts may desire to decrease
 361 the social wage w : however, if the social wage decreases *ceteris paribus*, the reproduction rate increases so
 362 that ecological-economic balance becomes much more fragile.

363 5. Empirics

364 Since the Ricardian model is highly stylized, the interpretation of its dynamical parameters is very
 365 abstract. However, three empirical measures for the reproduction rate can be tentatively suggested at the



Figure 7: **Empirical Values of the Rate of Energy Surplus Value**, own calculations based on the EORA database

366 country or region level: an energy rate of surplus (figure 7) by energy source, defined as the 2016 total
 367 production of energy divided by its household consumption following the EORA database (Lenzen et al.,
 368 2013); an ecological rate of surplus (figure 8) as the ratio of the ecological footprint to biocapacity (Global
 369 Footprint Network, 2024); or the labor rate of surplus (figure 6) following the Rotta-Kumar dataset (Rotta
 370 & Kumar, 2024).




Figure 8: **Empirical Values of Ecological Footprint to Biocapacity Ratio** (Global Footprint Network, 2024)

371 **6. Conclusions**

372 Paraphrasing Kalecki’s ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment’ (1943), addressing climate change is, like
 373 full employment, entirely feasible on paper; the problem, though, is of naked political power.

374 In the pressing context of the climate crisis, many academics call for a more diversified, more ambitious
 375 climate-policy portfolio including vigorous state support for green finance and green investment for energy
 376 and infrastructure. More skeptical voices in the tradition of de-growth consider instead that the uncoupling of
 377 carbon emissions to economic activity within such a limited time frame is straight unfeasible, hence favoring
 378 no growth so that the economy reaches a steady state within the carrying capacity of the environment.
 379 However, why would de-growth be more feasible than uncoupling?

380 **References**

381 **References**

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